Brazilian companies going global : Home country push factors of Brazilian multinational enterprises‘ (BMNEs‘) investments,

general characteristics and tendencies of their investments in the European,

especially East Central European (ECE) region by Ricz, Judit
  
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences – Institute of World Economics 
 MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont 
Világgazdasági Intézet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working paper 
 
231. 
 
 
       
September 2017 
 
 
 
 
Judit Ricz 
 
 
BRAZILIAN    COMPANIES    GOING    GLOBAL 
 
Home country push factors of Brazilian multinational enterprises‘ (BMNEs‘) 
investments,  general  characteristics  and  tendencies  of  their  investments  
in the European, especially East Central European (ECE) region 
 
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics  
Working Paper Nr. 231 (2017) 1–46. September 2017 
 
 
Brazilian companies going global1 
 
Home country push factors of Brazilian multinational enterprises‘ (BMNEs‘) investments, 
general characteristics and tendencies of their investments in the European, 
especially East Central European (ECE) region 
 
 
Author: 
 
Judit Ricz 
 
research fellow 
Institute of World Economics 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
email: ricz.judit@krtk.mta.hu  
 
 
The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of other 
members of the research staff of the Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
 
 
ISSN 1215-5241 
ISBN 978-963-301-651-0 
                                                 
1 This paper was written in the framework of the research project "Non-European emerging-market 
multinational enterprises in East Central Europe" (K-120053), supported by the National Research, 
Development and Innovation Office (NKFIH). 
  Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
Institute of World Economics  
Working Paper 231 (2017) 1– 46. September 2017 
 
 
Brazilian companies going global 
 
Home country push factors of Brazilian multinational enterprises‘ (BMNEs‘) investments, 
general characteristics and tendencies of their investments in the European,  
especially East Central European (ECE) region 
  
Judit Ricz2 
 
Abstract 
Recently we have seen a fundamental shift in the news regarding Brazilian 
multinational companies: as long as during the 2000s their successful expansion into 
global markets was celebrated, today their involvement in the widespread corruption 
scandal, originating from the kickback scheme (via systematic overpricing of contracts) 
from Petrobras is on a daily basis in the newspapers. The paper aims to analyse the 
going global strategy of Brazilian firms, with special emphasis on the home country 
push factors. After a general panorama on the numbers and main players, we look at the 
main driving forces behind the international expansion strategy (incl. government 
policies to support the internationalization of Brazilian MNEs), as well as the various 
obstacles Brazilian companies have faced on their dumpy road towards the global 
markets. Then we look at the main destinations of Brazil’s outward FDI, and analyse 
their localization strategies, with a special focus on the role of Europe (more specifically 
the Eastern Central European region). We provide some preliminary findings on the 
Brazilian companies present in the ECE region (especially in Hungary), while also try to 
reveal some region-specific driving forces and obstacles that might lie beyond the 
numbers. 
 
JEL: F21, F23, G11 
Keywords: Brazilian multinationals, internationalization strategy, OFDI 
 
1. Introduction 
Several Brazilian multinational companies have appeared in the headlines of 
international media during the recent years (since 2014). This was however much less 
glorious news then back in the 2000s, when their rise and breakthrough into the global 
markets was celebrated. More recently it is the widespread corruption scandal, the 
kickback scheme (via systematic overpricing of contracts) from Petrobras, the national 
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oil giant and other large companies (such as the Odebrecht and JBS) to political elites 
and parties in Brazil, the main reason why these companies are getting currently into 
the headlines of newspapers (even in international media). 
Back in the 2000s the situation was rather different: amid a rather prosperous and 
conducive external environment there was a fundamental shift in Brazilian economic 
policies, and outward orientation becoming the “name of the game” and has determined 
Brazil’s new attitude towards the global market. Several large Brazilian companies 
became prominent actors on the global level (global players), such as Petrobras (the 
national oil giant), Odebrecht (construction company), JBS (the meat processing 
company) or even Embraer (the aircraft manufacturer). There were even Brazilian 
brands that became known globally (such as the Havaianas). This move of Brazilian 
companies entering the global market was driven on the one hand by a dynamically 
ascending Brazilian economy and on the other hand by a deliberate economic policy 
change. President Lula urged already in 2003 the internationalization of Brazilian 
companies, and several measures and instruments were put into force to help the aim of 
Brazilian companies “going global”. 
By 2017 these days seem to have gone, and it is not just the corruption scandal that is 
weakening the current position of large Brazilian companies, but also the economic and 
political changes, within and outside Brazil, which we also shortly address in our 
outlook at the end of the paper. The main aim of this study is however to map the 
driving forces (push factors) behind the successful international expansion strategy of 
Brazilian EMNEs during the 2000s, thus the main focus is on the first one and a half 
decade after the Millennium (with data available at the writing of this paper until 2015). 
The paper also gives an overview on the localization strategies of Brazilian companies, 
with a special focus on the European market, while due to lack of data and the initial 
phase of the research we will only provide some preliminary impressions on their 
presence in the ECE region (which will be analysed deeper in an upcoming phase of the 
research project – also supported by primary data collection). 
The paper is in five parts: after this introduction we shortly present golden age of the 
2000s, when numerous large Brazilian companies successfully expanded to global 
markets through acquisitions and/or greenfield investments, but often relying on the 
support from the government. After a panorama on the numbers and main players, we 
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look at the main driving forces behind the international expansion strategy (incl. 
government policies to support the internationalization of Brazilian MNEs), as well as 
the various obstacles Brazilian companies have faced on their dumpy road. In the third 
section we turn towards the main destinations of Brazil’s outward FDI, while analysing 
the localization strategies we focus on the role of Europe (more specifically the 
European Union), and try to differentiate between the Western European region (with 
more traditional ties towards Latin America in general, and towards Brazil especially) 
and the Eastern Central European (ECE) region. In the following sections we focus on 
the ECE region to find out the general pattern and recent trends (10-15 years) of 
incoming FDI flows from Brazil. Especially we provide some preliminary findings on the 
Brazilian companies present in the ECE region (with a special focus on Hungary), while 
also trying to reveal some region-specific driving forces and obstacles that might lie 
beyond the numbers. In the fourth part we provide an outlook on the most recent period 
and finally conclude. 
 
2. Brazilian MNEs going global 
Brazil is the fifth largest country both by area and population and the ninth largest 
economy in the world by nominal GDP (and the eights largest by purchasing power 
parity). Brazils is the leading economy of South America, a prominent member of the 
elite club of emerging economies, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), and at least during the first decade of the twenty-first century it has shown 
strong ambitions and geopolitical aspirations to become a leader of the Global South. 
Even though during the recent years the global aspirations of Brazil have been faded, 
and the country has turned towards problems arising domestically, it has submitted a 
formal request to join the OECD in May 2017, signalling its ongoing commitment to get 
into the club of the more developed countries. 
An important aspect of the ascendance of the Brazilian economy and development 
during the 2000s has been the emergence of outward FDI flows from Brazil to conquer 
in international markets. 
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2.1 Brazilian companies investing abroad 
Historically Brazilian companies (both state- and privately-owned ones) were rather 
focusing on local (and regional) markets. There is a complexity of reasons beyond this, 
but the long period of import substitution industrialization and the large domestic 
market as well as the abundance of natural resources have without doubt played 
important roles. As a result Brazilian companies in general have had little incentive (and 
often also important competitiveness constraints) to expand to foreign markets. This 
picture has changed significantly in the early 2000s, when the boom in outward foreign 
direct investment started and marked the beginning of a new era. 
As it can be seen from the data (Figure 1) in the mid of the 90s, after the economic 
stabilization and market-oriented reforms, Brazil emerged as an important recipient of 
FDI flows. It was however only after 2003 when Brazil became a significant investor 
abroad – in parallel with emerging countries. Outward FDI flows from Brazil started to 
gain momentum as a result of several (coinciding) events. First, in economic front the 
export boom (based mainly of primary commodities export) generated increasing trade 
surplus, and this hand in hand with large flows of incoming FDI and the appreciation of 
the Real (the Brazilian currency), have boosted foreign exchange reserves, which has 
meant a favourable scenario for Brazilian firms to invest abroad. Mostly export-led 
Brazilian companies in industries, where Brazil traditionally enjoyed competitive 
advantages (such as iron ore, steel, meat, soybeans, etc.) have benefitted from improved 
access to domestic financial markets for financing their (mainly) market-seeking 
investments abroad (Campanario et al., 2012). In more general terms, the global market 
opportunities have also favoured these firms, as commodity prices were booming, 
fuelled by increasing demand from China, and led to (overly) optimistic atmosphere in 
global markets and rising investor’s confidence. Not surprisingly, looking at the sectorial 
division we can see an increase towards the natural resources sector (metals, mining, 
oil, gas and steel) (Resende et al., 2010). 
The words of Karl P. Sauvant, the Director of UNCTAD's Investment Division, are 
indicative in this regard. He argued in 2004, that “while Brazil has succeeded in attracting 
sizeable amounts of FDI in the past, it's only now that investment abroad by Brazilian TNCs 
appears poised to take off” (UNCTAD, 2004:2). 
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Second, on the policy front, these favourable economic conditions were accompanied 
by a fundamental shift in Brazilian policy attitude toward global markets (Casanova – 
Kassum, 2014:68). This can be best illustrated with the address of the former Brazilian 
President, Lula urging Brazilian companies to go global in 2003 (at a meeting of the 
Portuguese Industrial Association in Lisbon): “It is time for Brazilian businessmen to 
abandon their fear of becoming multinational businessmen” (UNCTAD, 2004:1). 
 
Figure 1: Inward and outward Foreign Direct Investment flows in Brazil  
(1995-2016, million US$) 
 
Source: own construction based on BCB data 
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Text box 1:  
Notes on OFDI data in Brazil 
The usual caveat on FDI data availability and reliability should be complemented in the case of 
Brazil by several notes. First, we highlight that fiscal regulations in Brazil tend to induce 
investments in tax heavens to escape the regulations and tax obligations (that are one of the 
most complicated and highest in the world), and this may significantly distort official data. 
Secondly, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) is considering every transaction resulting in a more 
than 10% ownership share as foreign direct investment, independently of its final aim, and this 
might also distort OFDI (and also portfolio investment) data.  
Furthermore we have cross checked available Brazilian OFDI data from the different sources, 
and the data from BCB, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and WDI (World Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank) are mostly identical for Brazilian IFDI and OFDI stocks and flows: however for the 
last 5 years (from 2011), the UNCTAD has recorded significantly lower records of OFDI from 
Brazil, than the BCB and other sources (see following table).  
 
Table 1: OFDI flows from Brazil (2010-2016, million US dollars): divergence between BCB and 
UNCTAD data  
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BCB 26763 16067 5208 14942 26040 13518 7815 
UNCTAD 22060 11062 -5301 -1180 2230 3092 -12434 
 
Most recent trends mi 
ght however probably better tracked by UNCTAD, as there seems to be consensus among 
analysts on the divestment activities of most important Brazilian MNEs under crises (Sheng – 
Carrera, 2017). 
 
It can be revealed from the data, that in 2006 the total Brazilian Direct Investments 
abroad outweighed the incoming Foreign Direct Investments in Brazil. An 
unprecedented event, showing the internationalization process of a country that 
explicitly aimed at consolidating its position as a global player also regarding its 
outward direct investment flows. However, this was an exceptional year, and this 
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performance can easily be explained by the Vale’s acquisition of the Canadian Inco for an 
estimated 17 billion US dollars (Resende et al, 2010:99). 
It is not unique however that yearly amounts of Brazilian OFDI are dominated by one 
or two transactions of the given year3, as indicated also by the relative low volume – 
most of all in the early 2000s – and relative high year-to-year volatility. Outward 
investment flows surpassed the 10 billion dollar threshold in 2006 in Brazil, with an 
average being below 1 billion dollars between 2000 and 2003 on a yearly basis, while 
between 2004 and 2008 the average jumped close to 17 billion (BCB, 2017). 
Furthermore, and also less surprisingly OFDI trends of Brazilian companies tend to 
highly correlate with the general economic trends of Brazil. It is straightforward to see 
how OFDI became negative as a response to the 2009 financial crisis, as foreign affiliates 
of Brazilian multinational enterprises started to repatriate capital to their parent firms 
mainly via intra-firm lending. Similar – divestment – tendencies can be captured during 
the last years, as the economic crisis evolves (even though data is inconclusive in this 
regard, see table 1 in textbox 1). 
                                                 
3 In 2004 for example the merger between Ambev (a Brazilian drinks group) and Interbrew (a Belgium-
based brewer) with its value of 5 million US dollars has accounted for more than the half of that year’s 
total Brazilian OFDI (with increased intra-company loans also accounting for 22 % of total outward 
flows that year) (UNCTAD, 2004). 
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Figure 2: Cycles of OFDI in Brazil (2005-2016, million US$) 
 
Source: own construction based on UNCTAD data 
Historically Brazilian firms tended to open up commercial offices to support their 
export activities as their first steps to expand abroad. During the early 2000s greenfield 
investments were the preferred mode of entry in foreign markets by Brazilian forms, 
mainly in the mining and energy industry (with Petrobras leading the row by overseas 
energy investments, but even the Ambev entered into other Latin American markets via 
greenfield investment – mainly for market-seeking reasons) (Sauvant, 2006:344). This 
trend has changed significantly and with OFDI flows gaining momentum by 2006 cross 
border mergers and acquisitions became the main form of Brazilian companies’ foreign 
investments. 
 
2.2 Are the largest Brazilian companies also the most globalized ones? 
Looking at the largest Brazilian firms, it is easy to see that these have done 
undoubtedly well during the first decade of the new Millennium. As long as in 2003 
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there have been only four Brazilian companies in the world’s top 500 largest companies 
(by revenues), in 2013 this number totalled to 8, though in 2016 this went back to 74. 
However not all of these large companies qualify as multinationals, as some of them 
have rather limited presence in overseas markets. Looking at the list of top 20 Brazilian 
multinationals (published annually by Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment as 
part of their Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) Project), we can see that Vale is on 
the top of the list, if looking at foreign assets abroad, and JBS is the first if looking at 
foreign sales or employees. Both are ahead of the largest Brazilian energy giant, the 
semi-state-owned Petrobras. But looking at rankings of major Brazilian companies by 
the transnationality index5 (published by Fundação Dom Cabral – FDC6) on the first 
seven places names of companies appear, that are often less known internationally, and 
that have rarely if at all appeared in the rankings of the largest companies, such as the 
Fitesa (hygiene business7), Iochpe-Maxion (equipments and parts), CZM (equipment and 
parts), Intercement (cement industry), Stefanini (software company), Artecola 
(petrochemicals), and Gerdau (steel producer) (FDC, 2016:53). At the same time 
internationally well-known Brazilian multinationals, such as JBS, Vale and Embraer only 
follow at the 8th, 18th and 24th places respectively. For some reason Petrobras is missing 
from the 2016 list, however in 2014 it has only made on the 38th place. 
                                                 
4 http://fortune.com/global500/  
5 The transnationality index was originally developed by UNCTAD, and is calculated as the arithmetic 
mean of the ratio of foreign assets to total assets, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and the ratio of 
foreign employment to total employment. 
6 FDC is a Brazilian non-profit organization providing a ranking and analysis of the internationalization of 
Brazilian companies every year since 2006. In the 2016 report the sample covered 64 companies. 
7 Fitese is manufacturing nonwoven fabrics for use in hygiene, medical and industrial specialty 
applications. 
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Text box 2: 
The predominant organizational structure for businesses in Brazil: family ownership and semi- or 
minority state-ownership 
To better understand why it has taken so long for Brazilian companies to turn towards the 
global markets, one has to take a look at the specificities of the Brazilian – or in more general the 
continent-wide Latin American – context, that has paved the trajectories of these Brazilian firms 
during the last century8. During the era of import substitution industrialization the Brazilian 
market was dominated by large family-owned conglomerates and huge state-owned enterprises, 
that were forced to operate in a very protected market, with high tariffs and underdeveloped 
capital markets. Mostly protected from any kind of competition, these firms were less under the 
pressure to constantly increase productivity, more often than not with inadequate levels of 
research and development and inherently risk-averse cultures, prone to a historically turbulent 
political and economic climate (Ramamurti, 2012; Santiso, 2013; Casanova – Kassum, 2014) 
At the same time the corporate structure of Brazil is dominated by a handsome of very large 
companies, the emerging giants (also called national champions), while there is a relative 
scarcity of average sized Brazilian companies, that could qualify as “to-be-multilatinas”. The ten 
largest Brazilian companies accounted for 40% of the accumulated revenues of the top 100 
Brazilian firms, while on the global level the same concentration was barely 20% (Casanova – 
Kassum, 2014:73). 
State-ownership has been historically significant in the strategic sectors of the Brazilian 
economy, and even after several phases of privatization, state influence stayed unusually strong, 
albeit rather in the form of minority shareholding, and other indirect forms (Musacchio-
Lazzarini, 2014; Ricz, 2017). In the same vein family ownership has also a long tradition in 
Brazil, although by today these are more often than not organized in diversified conglomerates 
(Casanova, 2016:32; Perez-Lluch, 2016). Family businesses still represent a dominant 
organizational structure in Brazil (examples are numerous, here we only note a few names, that 
might sound familiar to the Reader, as most of them are involved in the huge corruption scandal: 
Norberto Odebrecht, or the JBS, owned by Joesley and Wesley Batista, or the conglomerate of 
Andrade Gutierez (founded in 1948 in Belo Horizonte, in the region of Minas Gerais by the 
Andrade and Gutierrez families), and the list goes on with Gerdau, WEG, etc. But we could also 
mention the InBev – formerly Ambev – goes back to the merger and acquisition of several 
former family-founded breweries in Brazil, before it started its transnationalization process). 
                                                 
8 The story started however much earlier, as we should go back to the 19th century, or even to the 
colonialization to show how the rules and interests of the Portuguese empire have influenced the 
economic structures in Brazil.  
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All in all, our look at the largest and the most internationalized Brazilian companies 
reveals an important insight, which is in line with the results of Casanova and Kassum 
(2014:79): “the biggest Brazilian companies are not necessarily very internationalized, 
while the most internationalized Brazilian companies are not necessarily very big.” 
This statement might be however a little bit misleading, as the Brazilian companies 
most active abroad, are still larger firms, even if not necessarily the biggest ones. Small 
and medium-sized Brazilian enterprises were still having very low participation in 
foreign markets as compared to larger firms in 2015 (Sheng – Carrera, 2016:12). As we 
shall see in a later section, most public policies have also been biased towards 
promoting the internationalization of larger firms. There have been no special aims and 
measures to support SME’s activities abroad, and the smaller firms were rather 
disadvantaged not only regarding their outward focused activities, but also in the 
domestic market. 
 
2.3 Drivers of internationalization 
While mapping the drivers of internationalization of Brazilian MNEs, it is worth to 
remember the specificities of the Brazilian context (and in more general term the Latin 
American realities), that have been explained in earlier sections: such as the role of 
family-owned business, and the strong, albeit changing role of state-ownership with 
direct and indirect state influence, and a somewhat different, but not totally 
independent characteristic: resource abundance and the role of the primary resources. 
In the same vein the long historical period of the ISI policies (with a peak in the 60s and 
70s) has also left important consequences on the organizational structures and on the 
operation of companies throughout Latin America, and especially in Brazil. 
In Brazil one of the most important economic policy tendency that has influenced the 
hierarchical structure of its market economy (Schneider, 2013), has been the aim to 
promote “national champions”. These were either state-owned, or (directly or 
indirectly) state-backed large, specialized domestic firms that were protected from 
competition and have benefitted from government (export) subsidies and became 
leaders in their respective industries. These national champions were created and 
supported to drive the industrialization of the economy and serve as major engines for 
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economic development (including aims such as employment creation, growth promotion 
and gaining access and prestige in international markets) (Casanova, 2009b). 
After the years of liberalization and privatization during the 1990s, many of the 
former national champions maintained and even improved their leading positons in the 
Brazilian and international markets. The most-known and cited examples are: Embraer, 
Vale and Petrobras. 
As active industrial policies came back to the agenda during the new governments of 
the Workers Party (PT) in the early 2003, not only the different types of state influence 
were maintained and strengthened (via golden shares, indirect state-ownership via 
pension funds and the national development bank), but also new credit lines were put in 
operation, to help the internationalization of these national champions (see next 
section). 
 
2.3.1 Historical driving forces 
As presented earlier, the internationalization of Brazilian companies was a sequential 
process, dating back to the 60s and 70s, and we can differentiate five phases of this 
process. As the first major home country push factor in the internationalization process 
of Brazilian companies we look at broad macroeconomic factors that have historically 
determined the ability and desire of Brazilian companies to start operations abroad. 
During the first phase in the 60s and 70s some companies started to export and 
establish operations, mainly in markets with geographical and cultural proximity, the so 
called “natural market” (composed of Latin America, and some other Spanish or 
Portuguese speaking countries in Europe and Africa). After the economic miracle years 
of 1968-73, during the oil crisis and even more so during the lost decade of the 80s the 
domestic economic downturn, falling sales and public investments, most of the large 
(family-owned) Brazilian companies turned towards abroad, as the only viable 
expansion strategy. In this period the main driving force for internationalization was the 
bad and worsening outlook in the domestic market. (Here the classic examples are the 
operations of Odebrecht in Chile and Peru by the end of the 70s, and in Angola in the 
early-mid 80s.) 
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During the second phase on internationalization, the market-oriented reforms (in line 
with the Washington Consensus) of the 1990s (in fact until 2002) the main tendency 
was the heightened competition from foreign multinationals investing in Brazil. During 
this “competitive shock” (Casanova-Kassum, 2014:84) Brazilian companies were forced 
to reorganize their operations, including turning towards foreign financing and pushing 
forward their international expansion. Thus major push factor this time was the 
increasing competition within the domestic market and the inherent need to raise 
competitiveness, also via expansion of operations abroad. 
The third phase of internationalization of Brazilian companies started around 2002-3, 
and represents up today the most aggressive and successful period of Brazilian 
companies’ global expansion. Driven by high commodity process and increasing demand 
from Asia (mainly China), mostly resource-based companies (such as Petrobras and 
Vale) executed large-scale acquisitions in neighbouring and more distant (developed 
and emerging) markets. The most highlighted case was that of the Vale, and its 
acquisition of the Canadian firm Inco in 2006. This transaction has alone represented 
60% of the total Brazilian OFDI flow that year. The favourable international conditions 
and rising demand from Asia have served rather as important pull factors, whereas 
domestic economic growth9, rising sales and public investment have also acted as push 
factors as these allowed for companies to turn their attention towards international 
markets (as business has been doing well at home). 
It was also during this phase when public policies started to effectively drive the 
internationalization project: President Lula explicitly urged Brazilian companies to go 
global, and new BNDES credit lines were opened and supported by other regulatory 
measures to stimulate the internationalization of (mainly large) Brazilian companies. 
For a more detailed description of government policies acting as home country push 
factors for large Brazilian MNEs see following section. 
The fourth phase started with the global financial crisis in 2008, when amid the 
financial and economic turmoil in the Global North, emerging markets became major 
                                                 
9 Major Brazilian companies were also driven by the emergence of a new middle class in Brazil (in line 
with active social policies under the Lula era) and the subsequent increasing demand for consumer 
products. The food processing JBS-Friboi, or the retailer CBD (Grupo Pão de Açúcar) are good examples, 
but also Brazilian banks (Banco do Brasil, Bradesco and Itaú-Unibanco) have benefitted from rising 
levels of consumer credits (Casanova-Kassum, 2014:72). 
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destinations of FDI flows, and in more general terms the engines of global growth. As a 
result, major Brazilian firms started to re-orient their activities from advanced markets, 
towards emerging markets or even the domestic market. 
Finally, we differentiate a fifth phase10, starting in 2015, when the economic (and 
political) crisis in Brazil has culminated and its effects have been adding up. As long as in 
2012 and even in 2014 most authors and analysts have been writing about the resilience 
of Brazilian companies towards economic instability and volatility11, in 2017 reports 
(such as of the Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) Project) already write about 
divestment under crises (Sheng – Carrera, 2017). 
At the latest by 2015 and even more so during 2016 the different layers of the ever 
more complex Brazilian crisis have been adding up: not only the economic downturn 
(the most severe during modern Brazilian history), but also the Car Wash operation 
investigating the huge corruption scandal surrounding Petrobras and other major 
Brazilian firms, and changes in the political leadership and the following economic 
policy turn, all have resulted in a basically new and complex set of framework 
conditions, inhibiting most larger Brazilian companies to go on with their 
internationalization strategies. Most companies affected by the corruption scandal have 
announced plans to sell foreign subsidiaries and cancel or decrease future investment 
plans, in order to be able to pay the leniency fees and fines. The most striking example is 
obviously the Petrobras, which has announced to cut its investment until 2019 by 25% 
(the equivalent of 32 billion US dollars). 
Besides these main broad macroeconomic trends, other, mainly firm-specific factors 
have also stimulated (or constrained) the internationalization of Brazilian MNEs. These, 
obviously, differ from case to case, but some commonalities can be revealed (Casanova-
Kassum, 2014:84-85). First of all, a main motivation of going abroad was the aim to 
secure access to natural resources in foreign markets, and mainly in the case of resource-
based companies, such as Petrobras and Vale. Second, in the case of companies at the 
higher ends of the value chain, the desire was to better adapt to local needs and to better 
                                                 
10 The literature writes about four phases, mainly based on the work of Casanova (2009, 2014, 2016), 
these analysis end however by 2014-2015, exactly at the time, when we date the beginning of last phase.  
11 With catchy wording Casanova-Kassum (2014:85) write about the ability of Brazilian firms to tackle the 
persistent „voo de galinha“, which means something like chicken flight, and refers to short-term 
economic downturns.  
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serve these markets by becoming more responsive to local specificities. This was 
typically the case for Embraer (the airplane manufacturer) and Marcopolo (the bus 
manufacturer), that have opened up commercial offices and subsidiaries in order to be 
closer to the clients. As the third factor we can mention the aim of Brazilian exporting 
companies to avoid tariff and non-tariff barriers by opening up production units in their 
end markets (instead of solely exporting). Examples are the steel company Gerdau, and 
the orange juice maker Cutrale. Last but not least, many companies have chosen to 
internationalize with the aim to learn and upgrade by being imposed to higher 
competition in international markets (in contrast to the rather protected and closed 
domestic market). The retail sector and food industry can offer good examples for this 
strategy. Casanova and Kassum (2014:85) mention for example the beauty products 
company Natura and its opening up a retail store in Paris, the international centre for 
the beauty industry). 
Among several specificities of Brazilian companies (such as related to state-
ownership or influence, family-ownership, the hierarchical market economy structure), 
an often-highlighted distinctive characteristic is the so called resilience to volatility, 
meaning the ability to navigate (and do business) under volatile economic conditions. 
This ability has been achieved by operating in volatile domestic markets during the 
twentieth century, characterized by unstable economic conditions (recurring crises), 
overregulated markets, and infrastructural bottlenecks as well as in more general terms 
by one of the most challenging business environment in the world. Casanova – Kassum 
(2014:87) argue, that even though these conditions might have negatively affected both 
the daily operation and long-term development perspectives of the firms, their resulting 
ability to successfully operate under such perverse conditions might be regarded today 
as a competitive advantage, if doing business under similar constraints (physical or legal 
infrastructural deficiencies). A good example is the food processing company BRF that 
has developed a world class distribution network for frozen and refrigerated products, 
and was able to successfully expand towards the MENA region and overcome all the 
imperfections typical for these Arab markets. 
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2.3.2 Current driving forces of internationalization of Brazilian MNE’s 
According to a most recent survey on the top 20 Brazilian MNE’s ranked in terms of 
foreign assets, the primary reasons for investing global were the following (Sheng – 
Carrera, 2017:10): 1. Access to new markets; 2. Proximity to clients; 3. Cost reduction; 4. 
Access to natural resources; 5. High taxes and institutional voids in Brazil (such as 
corruption, poor transportation system and unqualified labour force). Some companies 
have also cited access to new technologies, however the overall ranking and relevance of 
this factor, was much lower, than in the case of the above mentioned drivers. 
 
Figure 3: Main motivations for internationalization 
 
Source: Sheng –Carrera, 2017:11 
 
From these above mentioned driving forces we highlight the desire as to avoid high 
taxes and institutional voids as an important push factor for Brazilian firms to go 
abroad, as all the other factors are more in line with traditional push factors present in 
the cases of more developed countries’ and thus thoroughly analysed in classic FDI 
literature. 
Looking at the Brazilian internationalization process in a more historical perspective 
we have argued that in more general terms the macroeconomic context, the domestic 
instability has also pushed the companies to expand in more stable economies, so as to 
compensate the risks faced at their home markets. 
Not independently from the broad macroeconomic volatility, high capital costs (high 
interest rates, expensive credit facilities, high transaction costs and scarcity of long term 
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credit) at home have also pushed Brazilian companies towards setting up subsidiaries 
abroad and gaining access to cheaper credit facilities overseas. 
Extensive literature addresses the internationalization process of EMNEs as a 
learning process, and claim that these companies do not always begin their expansion 
abroad with clear competitive advantages, but rather acquire it meanwhile, and the aim 
to acquire knowledge can be considered as an important driving force behind their 
international activities. This argumentation is also found for Brazil (e.g. Casanova, 
2016), and a good example is the already mentioned beauty company Natura and its 
subsidiary in Paris, France. 
As an important driving force to support OFDI flows in Brazil (as in some other 
emerging economy) we will look at the role of public policies, especially the role of the 
Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) to improve capital availability (via 
providing cheaper long-term credit in certain strategic sectors) in the next section. 
Before turning to the role of the state in supporting Brazilian firms to go and invest 
abroad, we provide a short overview on the constraints and obstacle (smaller) Brazilian 
firms have faced while trying to internationalise. 
 
2.3.3 Some obstacles to internationalise (for smaller firms and beyond Latin America) 
The start of the twenty-first century has been labelled as “the decade of the 
multilatinas” (Santiso, 2013), and this certainly stands for Brazilian MNEs, with some 
outstanding success stories, such as the Embraer, which has become a world leader in 
regional air-jets. There have been however many smaller companies with similar going 
global ambitions to become “multilatinas”, for which expanding beyond the natural 
markets (the Latin American region) has proved to be particularly difficult, especially 
when they thrived for entering developed and advanced markets (Pyper, 2015). 
To better understand this phenomenon, we have to recall, that besides the 
abovementioned drivers of internationalization, there were important challenges that 
acted as constraints for Brazilian firms while trying to expand towards international 
markets. 
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Among the home country factors, that act as internal barriers we can highlight the 
general business environment, which is rather unconducive towards doing business in 
Brazil. The World Bank’s doing business indicators only go back to 2003, but anyone 
who has already been in Brazil and tried to set up a business (or conduct any other 
official act) can tell stories about the traditionally and historically slow and cumbersome 
legal system and the so called custo Brasil, the red tape or also labelled Brazil cost, 
referring to the increased operational costs associated with doing business in Brazil 
(including excessive bureaucracy, inefficient public services and high levels of 
corruption, just to name of few factors, that contribute to extra costs of setting up or 
doing business in Brazil). According to a survey conducted in 2011 among top Brazilian 
MNEs by the SOBEET (2012), the interviewed outward investors highlighted the 
following internal constraints to their internationalization: 1. currency fluctuations; 2. 
high tax burden; 3. high logistics costs; 4. high credit costs; 5. lack of skilled human 
resources; 6. competition with projects in Brazil. 
Besides these internal barriers, Brazilian companies aiming at internationalize also 
face important external barriers, stemming from global competition and differences in 
prevailing global conditions. According to the respondents of the above cited survey 
major external barriers ranks as follows: 1. tough competition in mature markets; 2. 
differences in regulatory environment; 3. difficulties in managing international 
operations; 4. barriers imposed by local industry; 5. difficulties in raising funds in 
overseas markets in competitive terms; 6. lack of double taxation treaties. 
 
2.4 Internationalization as a state-led process: public policies to promote OFDI 
of Brazilian MNEs 
The rise of EMNEs on the global level is challenging the traditional argumentation of 
„mainstream“ economic theories both in international business and development 
economics (Nölke, 2014). There is at least one important distinctive feature of the 
internationalization EMNEs: the fact that more often than not they have relied on the 
active support of their respective governments to conquer on external markets (Caseiro 
– Masiero, 2014; Goldstein, 2007; Johnson, 2012). This was certainly the case in Brazil: 
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at the latest from 200312 the Brazilian government has actively tried to encourage 
outward foreign direct investment through expensive and often controversial (and 
debated) public policies which have also come to the limelight during the currently 
unfolding corruption scandal. 
A thorough analysis on the role of the state in Brazilian economic development is out 
of the scope if this paper (for this see: Wylde, 2012; Ricz, 2017)13, hence here we 
concentrate on the analysis of the Brazilian government’s strategy to promote the 
internationalization of Brazilian companies and to encourage Brazilian outward FDI 
flows. 
Until the 2000s the direct promotion of outward investment has not entered the 
economic policy agenda. The internationalization of Brazilian companies, as presented 
above was largely driven by the companies themselves (Fleury-Fleury, 2011), the state 
has not played a key (direct) role in this (early) process. Since the early 2000s some new 
forms of BNDES support appeared, however these remained stand-alone programs, and 
there has been no comprehensive strategy to support the global expansion of Brazilian 
firms. This is in stark contrast with China and some other Asian countries (like South 
Korea), where the „developmentalist“ governments have been the key driving force 
behind the internationalization of firms and actively supported the global 
competitiveness of their strategic industries. 
During the decades of the ISI period the Brazilian economy aimed at relying on the 
self-sufficiency of the internal markets – thus FDI flows were severely constrained. We 
have presented the several phases of the internationalization of Brazilian companies, 
starting in the 60s and 70s in an earlier section. Here we highlight, that this was rather a 
                                                 
12 But we will show, that some measures were already in place since 1998. 
13 In development economics, especially in developmental state literature industrial policies have been at 
the center of academic debates (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989, 2001; Wade, 1990, 2014; Evans, 1995, 
2014; Rodrik, 2004). Most authors have however focused in the effects industrial policies might (or 
might not) exert on economic growth or the diversification of domestic production, and policies 
encouraging OFDI, as part of an outward-oriented development strategy were neglected by these 
analyses. As a different line of literature we might also recall the structuralist approach to economic 
development (Raul Prebisch, Hollis Chenery, Celso Furtado, Albert Hirschman, to recall the most famous 
classic authors), which claimed that the national development depends upon the dynamic position the 
country occupies in the international division of labour, as the way how an economy integrates into the 
global markets (and value chains) invokes structural changes in the domestic economy. Policies to 
promote OFDI were however side-lined also by this approach. 
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spontaneous process, driven by the companies themselves, and neither guided, nor 
directly promoted by the government. 
Obviously there is a great number of public policy areas where the state can influence 
the internationalization of firms: labour policies (to reduce costs and increase 
flexibility); trade policies (inhibiting or rewarding export and import activities, thereby 
impacting competitive advantages); privatization and public utility regulatory 
frameworks (setting conditions and incentives in some industries where large 
internationalized firms have great potential for emergence); taxation policies (might 
targeting specific industries, e.g. via exemption measures or subsidized rates) 
(Finchelstein, 2017) – to name just a few. 
 
Text box 3:  
Direct and indirect forms of promoting internationalization of firms 
These public policies can be differentiated on the base whether they exert a direct or rather an 
indirect effect on the internationalization strategy and/or potential of the firms. Indirect forms 
of state intervention are in line with the so called liberal market economy model of the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall – Soskice, 2001), and mainly promote market incentives, 
strengthen the capital market, etc. Direct forms of state intervention range from selecting 
strategic industries, promoting national champions and setting up special credit lines to 
promote the internationalization process. These non-market alternatives are closer to the 
coordinated market economy model of the VoC approach. However the way and how of state 
intervention and the extent of state influence differs in its magnitude in in the case of emerging 
economies, from their European (and Japanese) counterpart. Thus the Brazilian variety of 
capitalism is often labelled with the hierarchical market economy (Schneider, 2013) or – along 
with other BRICS countries – the state-permeated market economy – as applied by Nölke 
(2014).  
In the case of Brazil we will focus on policies to promote national champions and capital 
availability, as these were the two main striking distinctive features that have characterized the 
internationalization process of the Brazilian firms. The promotion of national champions goes 
back to the ISI period in Brazil, looking at economic policy aims and measures in the 2000s there 
is a striking continuity in this regard in Brazil. In Latin America in general, and in Brazil in 
particular firms traditionally had to cope with extra obstacles to expand internationally and the 
constraint of capital availability was a rather permanent problem (due to higher costs of 
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accessing funds). Thus the analysis of state actions to improve capital availability (via special 
credit lines offered by the national development bank) is of special relevance for the case of 
Brazil. 
Looking at Brazil’s regional competitors, we can argue that the Brazilian way of promoting the 
internationalization of local firms was much more direct and active than the more market-based, 
indirect way of Chile, or the rather inconsistent set of public policies applied by Argentina 
(Finchelstein, 2017). However if we compare the Brazilian case to China, we have to argue that 
compared to the emerging market giant, Brazil had a much less comprehensive and a rather 
defensive strategy to promote OFDI, based mainly on existing comparative advantages and 
promoting industries, that were already highly competitive internationally (Caseiro-Masiero, 
2014). 
 
After 1990 and the liberalization efforts most policy measures were devoted to 
attract FDI into Brazil – as in the context of foreign exchange scarcity, high indebtedness, 
low competitiveness of the state-dominated production sector, privatization efforts, etc. 
– foreign capital inflows were to be promoted, while any type of capital outflow was to 
be prevented (important restrictions were also put in force). 
Outward FDI flows from Brazil and public policies to promote these, came onto the 
development agenda only after the economic stabilization in the mid of the 90s, however 
the progressive liberalization of capital accounts, have to be regarded as an important 
prerequisite for these. 
The first direct instrument to promote the internationalization of Brazilian 
companies goes back to 1998, when a separate credit line was introduced by the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to help foreign governments to realize large 
infrastructure projects (mainly in Latin America and Africa14) by hiring Brazilian 
engineering companies. The BNDES loans may have added up to 85 % of the total value 
of the construction projects, which made these not only available but also lucrative for 
Brazilian MNEs. This was however contingent upon the fact, that in each infrastructure 
project abroad the products manufactured in Brazil had to make up at least 35 % of the 
Bank’s disbursement (Caseiro – Masiero, 2014:241-242). This requirement was put in 
                                                 
14 BNDES loans were essential to make Brazilian companies competitive against the expanding Chinese 
companies, that were also supported by their government. 
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place in order to foster exports (of manufactured goods) and to promote positive 
spillovers in the Brazilian supply chains. 
However, if we look at the early results, we can see that during the first five years 
only five projects were funded by BNDES (all of them in South America) with an average 
disbursement of 74 million US dollars per year (ibid). 
The second instrument aiming at directly financing Brazilian companies to invest 
abroad was put in place in 2002 and included both loans and subscription of securities. 
This credit line was first used only in 2005 (when the JBS acquired the Argentine 
subsidiary of its American competitor, the Swift company) (Sennes – Mendes, 2009). In 
the same year (2005) as an important complementary measure the Brazilian Central 
Bank (BCB) removed the prior authorization requirement of all OFDI projects above the 
5 million US dollar threshold, and this has to be regarded as important milestone in 
Brazilian OFDI policies. 
To draw an interim balance, we can state that until 2007 there was no coherent policy 
framework in Brazil to support OFDI. There were two instruments, special credit lines 
(supplemented by the regulatory measure lifting the prior authorization requirement of 
OFDI projects by the Central Bank) which tried to promote (with rather questionable 
success) the internationalization of Brazilian companies. 
The year 2007 represents however an important turning point regarding Brazilian 
OFDI promotion policies, as with the adoption of the „Production Development Policy“ 
(PDP), the new industrial policy plan explicit goals for OFDI support were laid down, and 
a more coherent policy approach (however short-lived) started. The PDP has set the 
strategic goal of expanding and consolidating the international leadership of Brazilian 
EMNEs in those strategic industries, in which Brazil has already possessed international 
competitiveness, such as aeronautics, oil and gas, petrochemical, ethanol, mining, steel, 
pulp and paper and meat (MDIC, 2008)15. 
Between 2005 and 2011 the BNDES supported the internationalization of Brazilian 
companies by 4.9 billion US dollars, and this consisted almost exclusively of securities 
subscription. In addition, the BNDES continued to finance overseas infrastructural 
projects with an annual average summing up to 1,1 billion US dollars between 2007 and 
                                                 
15 „Keep or position the local productive system amongst the top 5 world exporters/global players.” 
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2012, when the total number of these projects exploded to 97 (compared to the total of 
5 projects and 350 million US dollars between 1998 and 2002) (Caseiro-Masiero, 
2014:242). 
Even though the international expansion of technology-intensive companies also 
emerged among the goals, in reality these remained restricted, and the overwhelming 
majority (more than 95%) of the BNDES financed OFDI projects went to meat 
processing companies (such as JBS and Mafrig)16. 
There is a note in place regarding the extensive financing of domestic operation of 
Brazilian MNEs via BNDES, as this has freed up earnings to fund OFDI projects even for 
those companies that borrowed from BNDES only for domestic projects – for which the 
BNDES has usually set lower interest rates. 
BNDES disbursements were responsible for 72 % of long term credit for companies in 
Brazil in the early 2010s. In the light of the traditionally high domestic interest rates in 
Brazil several authors (such as Masiero et al., 2014; Musacchio – Lazzarini, 2014) 
emphasize, that the BNDES has taken advantage of its oligopolistic position in the 
industrial credit supply and increased its shareholder stake in some of the largest 
Brazilian MNEs17. In some large MNEs (Vale, Embraer) the BNDES even has golden 
shares, giving the bank veto power in several important decisions, but also in other 
cases the bank’s ability to influence operational decisions has expanded. 
It was not only the BNDES operations explicitly financing OFDI projects that the bank 
helped Brazilian MNES to expand beyond the Brazilian market. Several domestic 
acquisitions were also financed, and led to intra-industry consolidation of domestic 
markets, while strengthening the positions of the so called „national champions“ and 
implicitly and indirectly harming the small and medium sized enterprises. 
                                                 
16 The BNDES would in principle aim to widen its activities towards building competitive advantage in 
high technology sectors. However the statement of the former BNDES vice-president, currently one of its 
directors, João Carlos Ferraz is telling: “…the Bank would finance a technology-based company’s project 
if one were presented to the Bank” (cited by Massi, 2014:223). 
17 This argumentation is in line with the views of Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) describing the 
transformation of state capitalism in line with changes in forms of the state-ownership, and highlighting 
new forms and channels of exerting state power. In this vein the Brazilian government applies the 
minority shareholder approach to maintain some power to protect the nationality and influence the 
investment decisions of main Brazilian MNEs.  
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After heavy critics (and strengthening pressure from Brazilian business elite), and as 
a consequence of change in the presidency (Dilma Rousseff followed Lula as President, 
and even though being his handpicked successor, and member of the same political 
party, the Workers Party – PT, important discontinuities in economic policy decisions 
followed), but also in the light of worsening economic indicators a new industrial policy 
document was instated in 2011, the Bigger Brazil (Brasil Maior) plan. This has contained 
the reorientation of industrial policy priorities, while it has also foreseen to support 
OFDI not only in already highly competitive industries, but to promote to obtain foreign 
technologies and/or access to new markets. To this priority however no specific goal 
and no further policy instrument or action was instituted, thus no implementation 
followed. Caseiro and Masiero (2014:244) write about the „interruption of the global 
champions policy“, and cite Luciano Coutinho (the BNDES president by that time) saying 
that the number of those sectors, in which Brazilian companies are internationally 
competitive enough to be promoted as potential global champions is limited, and he 
cannot see other sectors, with the same potential. Thus in his opinion, the policy aiming 
at supporting the internationalization of large Brazilian MNEs has run its course and 
thus it has been concluded. 
There were also other factors beyond these changes of public policies that have also 
contributed to the reversal of international expansion of large Brazilian companies. In 
the case of Petrobras for example, behind the decisions of discontinuing some overseas 
projects and selling foreign assets after 2011, the prioritization of domestic market, and 
the challenges of exploration of the „recently“ discovered pre-salt reserves have 
certainly played an important role. While more recently the fall in oil prices, and later on 
the evolving corruption scandal has forced the company to oversee its investment 
strategy and announce several divestment plans. 
Even though we have argued that between 2007 and 2011 a relative coherent policy 
framework existed in Brazil to promote the internationalization of Brazilian companies, 
there were several barriers constraining the achievement of coherent action. On the one 
hand Brazil has not put in force any of its signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
with the partner countries18, that could have reduced the political risk of investing 
                                                 
18 Brazil has signed 21 BITs, seven of which were concluded in 2015 (Angola, Chile, Colombia, Malawi, 
Mexico, Mozambique and Peru), and an additional one was initialized with India in 2016. 
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abroad (this was mainly due to the ideological opposition of the Brazilian Congress, that 
vetoed these agreements back in the 1990s and early 2000s, but the ratification was 
opposed also more recently, as these were considered by the Congressmen as threats to 
the country’s sovereignty). On the other hand, Brazil had signed Double Taxation 
Treaties (DTTs) – to guarantee isonomic tax policy for MNEs and their local subsidiaries 
– with 29 countries, however none of these was with the important markets of the 
Brazilian MNEs (such as the US, Germany or the UK). This might be explained by the 
resistance of the Brazilian Ministry of Finance not to lose tax incomes it thrived for, but 
might have also led to the heavy presence of the so called „tax heavens“ in the 
destination of Brazilian OFDI. 
The Brazilian „going global policy” was part of a more defensive industrial policy 
strategy. The majority of the OFDI disbursement from BNDES has gone into sectors, that 
were at the core of the Brazilian industrial complex (which came to life during the ISI 
period), with main focus on the sectors of meat processing, construction and 
petrochemicals. The subsidized loans provided by the BNDES between 2007 and 2011 
went disproportionally to large companies, that would have been able to obtain credit 
on the international financial markets (Musacchio-Lazzarini, 2014, Massi, 2014), as they 
were the most competitive players of the Brazilian economy. 
Whereas the promotion of SMEs, as potential future global players or aims such as to 
capture dynamic comparative advantages of host markets, and/or alleviating the 
bottlenecks in the domestic markets were and remained out of the scope and focus of 
the Brazilian OFDI strategy. 
To sum up we claim, that the Brazilian OFDI strategy was a defensive one (compared 
for example to its Chinese counterpart’s more aggressive stance), as it was rather based 
on already existing dynamic comparative advantages, thus it preferred to support 
industries, that were already highly competitive internationally (Caseiro – Masiero, 
2014). We have argued in line with the above mentioned authors, that this investment 
promotion strategy has lower potential to generate positive spillovers to the domestic 
economy, thus was less successful domestically in developmentalist terms. This is why, 
even though relatively successful abroad, Brazilian OFDI policies lie (deservedly) at the 
centre of political and academic debates. 
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In international comparison among the emerging countries the Brazilian OFDI 
policies seem to be less interventionist (compared to China for example, while on the 
other end it was of course more driven by direct state interventions than the more 
liberal counterparts, such as Chile or the majority of the more advanced countries). The 
Brazilian government is exercising direct power over the two state-owned company 
(Petrobras and Banco do Brasil), while in other cases it is „only“ minority shareholder. 
At the same time however it is almost exclusive provider of long term (subsidized) 
credit via the BNDES, which makes the state influence excessively strong, albeit rather 
via indirect channels. All in all we can state that with some exception of infrastructural 
projects in Latin America and Africa, the Brazilian government is not directly influencing 
OFDI allocation decisions (such as the Chinese government does for example). 
 
3. Main Brazilian OFDI destinations: the role of Europe, especially East Central 
Europe (ECE region)  
According to latest data (2015) most Brazilian outward FDI is accumulated in its 
“natural market”, composed by its immediate neighbourhood, the Latin American 
region, and some other Portuguese speaking countries (Portugal, and some other 
African former colonies)19. In this vein Portugal is the gateway for Brazilian companies 
to Europe, as it was the case for Banco Itaú in 1994 to open its first European 
headquarter in Lisbon, or the Embraer’s expansion into the European market via the 
acquisition of the Portuguese aerospace company (OGMA) in 2004 (Casanova, 
2016:32)20. 
In a wider sense the Ibero-American world can also be regarded as a natural market 
for Brazil, as it shares similar cultural, institutional setting and the two predominant 
languages, the Spanish and Portuguese are quite similar and the flow of immigrants both 
                                                 
19 Institutionally these countries are bounded together in the intergovernmental organization of the 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Portuguese: Comunidade dos Países de Língua 
Portuguesa – CPLP), often also referred to as the Lusophone countries, that share the Portuguese is 
official language (and as they are mostly of former colonies of the Portuguese Empire – also share some 
cultural and institutional similarities).  
20 Even though often cited in literature, the role of the natural market has not to be overvalued, as there 
are some examples that show the failure of otherwise promising firms to expand in their natural 
markets. A good example is the failure of Brazilian fast-food chains to expand to Brazil (Figueira et al, 
2013). 
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into and out of Brazil has led to constant exchanges of people and information while also 
impacting the culture in both directions (ibid). 
 
3.1 Main destinations of Brazilian OFDI in the world 
Geographically the main destination of Brazilian OFDI flows is the Latin American 
region, with a strong predominance of the Caribbean Islands (such as the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas), that serve as tax havens. On the 
second place comes Europe, however with also strong dominance of countries 
(Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and more recently Austria), where through setting 
up special purpose entities Brazilian firms primarily aim at avoiding the burdensome 
domestic taxes and bypassing complicated Brazilian regulations. 
 
Figure 4: Number of firms with operations in each region in 2015 
 
Source: Sheng – Carrera, 2017:29 
Note: Plants, commercial subsidiaries, business offices, or distribution centres are considered as 
operational units. 
 
Looking at the country level data (Annex 1), and leaving aside the abovementioned 
“tax havens”, most (supposedly) productive investment has gone to Spain, United States, 
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Chile, Argentina, United Kingdom, Portugal and Uruguay (and this order shows the 
ranking by OFDI stock data from 2015 according to the Brazilian Central Bank). In 
general Asia and Africa has received only a very small fraction of Brazilian OFDI, even 
though there have been some (rather dubious) investments in lusophone (Portuguese-
speaking) African countries (such as in Angola and Mozambique). 
Looking at most recent OFDI flows, we have to highlight the ascending trend of 
Brazilian FDI flowing towards Austria, which can be considered as a more recently 
discovered “tax haven” destination of Brazilian firms. In December 2016 Brazil’s tax 
authority has reacted to this evolution, as it has included Austria on the list of countries 
with “privileged tax regimes” (Denmark and the Netherlands were included already in 
2010). Holding companies investing in these countries without substantial economic 
activities are subject to stricter transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules in Brazil 
(KPMG, 2017). 
 
3.2 The role of Europe in Brazilian OFDI destinations 
Looking at accumulated investment stocks the EU was “traditionally” the second 
largest OFDI destination for Brazil, after Latin America, since 2009 however the EU 
became the main recipient of Brazilian investments (see figure). 
 
Figure 5: Brazilian OFDI stocks in selected regions (billion US$) 
 
Source: Masiero et al, 2014:142 
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Traditionally Brazilian companies when expanding abroad started their international 
activities mainly in their natural markets, in the immediate geographical proximity. 
Outside Latin America, however the Portuguese-speaking countries can be considered 
as the next most straightforward destinations, with Portugal being the bridge towards 
Europe and the European Union market. Main recipient countries in Europe beyond 
Portugal are the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
In general Europe did not represent any special priority in the localization strategies 
of the Brazilian companies, nor was there any government priority to promote the 
expansion of Brazilian forms towards the European market. This process was rather 
driven by the companies themselves, and their own priorities to follow the clients, 
search for new markets, or the desire to acquire knowledge in Europe. 
 
3.3 Global patterns and recent trends (10-15 years) of Brazilian FDI flows to the 
ECE region 
First and foremost, we have to anticipate that we have not found any former study 
concentrating on Brazilian investments in the ECE region. There are a few studies, which 
include certain aspects (such as Éltető (2014) analysing trade and investment relations 
between Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, or Masiero at al. (2014) looking 
at the expansion of Brazilian Multinationals into Europe), however no specific analysis 
was dedicated to Brazilian OFDI into Central and Eastern Europe. 
There is also an obvious reason for this: foreign direct investment coming from Brazil 
to the ECE countries is characterised by relatively low volume and high year-to year 
volatility (as these are mostly bound to one or two transactions of BMNEs). These 
investments stay mostly below any threshold of international surveys that usually map 
larger OFDI flows (such as EPMG, BCG, FDC, etc.) of mainly top 20 Brazilian (non-
financial) companies. 
Another characteristic of these investments lies in the fact, that more often than not, 
these are not real, productive investments, rather just transactions on papers, such as to 
avoid large tax burden or other regulations at home. For this it is indicative that from 29 
Brazilian-owned companies in Hungary that are present on paper, only 4 have reported 
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to have more than one employee in 201621. Consequently, there is also a relative scarcity 
on the data, as most investment coming from Brazil into the ECE region is not included 
in datasets (such as the Amadeus database, the one we aimed to use for this research). 
Thus in this chapter we provide some very preliminary results of our research and 
further investigations are needed in order to thoroughly analyse the role of BMNEs in 
ECE countries. 
According to FDC (2016) the Brazilian presence in the ECE region is composed by the 
following numbers: 3 companies in Hungary, 2 in Poland, 1 in Czech Republic (and 1 in 
Romania and also 1 in Ukraine). 
New Brazilian entrants in 2015 were concentrating in US, LAC and EU in a quite equal 
manner – at least looking at the numbers of companies involved (nine, nine and eight 
respectively (FDC, 2016:76)). From the eight countries, where Brazilian companies have 
set up new business in 2015, only one was located in ECE (namely in Hungary). 
Within Europe most Brazilian FDI flows to Western European countries, and the ECE 
region lags well behind. A possible explanation might be simply the geographical 
distance, but also the lack or historically low levels of other relations. This relatively low 
level and dynamic flows of Brazilian foreign investment was further negatively impacted 
by the recent global crisis, and the Brazilian economy’s crisis unfolding since 2014. 
Looking at the Amadeus database we can see that only two companies (both settled in 
Slovakia) are listed Rudolph Usinados and Micro Juntas – none of them corresponds to 
the most important and significant companies in the ECE region, or even in Slovakia 
itself. We aim to supplement this database in a further phase of this research, thus now 
we concentrate on the rather general picture, and on some specific cases. 
Looking at available data by the Brazilian Central Bank and the ECE countries’ Central 
Banks a rather inconclusive picture emerges. A good example is, that for both Hungary 
and Poland the BCB has recorded positive (though low levels of) incoming Brazilian 
investments in recent years, while according to the Hungarian and Polish Central Bank 
there is an outflow of Brazilian FDI from both Hungary and Poland (Kugiel, 2016:20-23). 
A very same picture emerges for the Czech Republic from the analysis of Castro and 
                                                 
21 Based on data received from the Brazilian Embassy in Budapest. In any other Hungarian sources much 
lower number appears regarding Brazilian companies present in Hungary.  
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Hnát (2017:64), where the exceptional years are 2009 and 2013 (and most probably 
related to the Embraer investment, to be mentioned later on). 
In the yearly reports of the Brazilian Central Bank on Brazilian OFDI flows, no country 
of the ECE region is listed separately, all are included in the remainder category of 
Others. In the yearly reports on OFDI stock the BCB lists Hungary and Slovakia 
separately (with the other ECE countries included again within the others category), and 
as it can be seen in the following table Brazilian investments peaked in Hungary in 2012, 
while in Slovakia in 2009. 
 
Table 2: Brazilian Foreign Direct Investment stock in Hungary and Slovakia  
(2007-2015, US$ million) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Hungary   901   1 827   1 751   2 489   2 513   3 207   3 026   3 229   2 803  
Slovakia (a) (a)   659    166    166    42  (a)   18    16  
Note: (a) Confidential data, composed by less than three respondents. 
Source: own construction based on data from BCB (2017) 
 
All in all we highlight that the amounts of Brazilian FDI coming to the ECE region in 
small – even negligible in its magnitude) in comparison to other outward investor 
countries in the region (such as for example China). A possible explanation for this might 
be of course the lack of capital in the Brazilian market on the one hand, and the 
extensive investment possibilities in the Brazilian market itself on the other hand. We 
must however also highlight more simple reasons, such as the geographical and even 
cultural or historical distance of the two regions. At the same time the more recent 
declining trend of Brazilian OFDI flows can be explained by the recent global crisis in 
2008-9, and also the unfolding Brazilian crisis since 2014. 
 
3.4 Hungary as a main destination of Brazilian OFDI within the ECE region 
To illustrate the general characteristics of Brazilian investments in ECE region and 
provide a more detailed picture, we focus on Hungary. According to the current business 
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register, 29 companies are wholly or partly Brazilian-owned in Hungary22. It is apparent 
from the list of these countries, that these are mostly small companies, with low levels of 
investment and/or revenues. It is difficult to find detailed data on these companies, as 
these constitute to be more often than not classical foreign direct investments (engaged 
mostly not in productive activities – with some exceptions, that are listed in the 
following text box), but rather dealing with asset management or operating as financial 
centers. These transactions often have the only aim to avoid taxes or regulations back in 
Brazil, and thus Hungary operates for them as “tax haven”. Often even the size of the 
capital investment cannot be traced and some of these cases should not even be 
classified as incoming foreign direct investment. We also have to add that several larger 
companies formerly present in Hungary have withdrew their activities, such as 
Petrobras, JBS, Fibria or Gerdau. 
While talking to the members of the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) 
and revealing information from the colleagues of the Brazilian Embassy in Hungary, we 
can state that Brazilian companies more often than not come to Hungary, if they have 
had some earlier contact with the country, mainly via personal or family relations 
(former expatriates come back to invest – mainly in real estate). In some other cases the 
companies settled in Hungary are subsidiaries of other Brazilian companies having 
already units in Europe and expanding their activities towards the Eastern region (such 
as in the case of BRF, as the BFR Hungary Kft. was opened via the BRF Gmbh. Wien 
operating in Austria). 
                                                 
22 Based on data received from the Brazilian Embassy in Budapest (contact person Zoltán Kérészy). 
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Text box 4:  
A sample of Brazilian companies present in Hungary23 
 
AB InBev Hungary Ltd. 
The Belgian Interbrew company bought the Brazilian AmBev company in 2004, and became InBev. The 
InBev bought the American Anheuser-Busch company in 2008 and became AB InBev. The AB InBev 
Hungary Kft. was established on 01.08.2006, with main activities of management and consulting, and with 
a registered capital of 400 million HUF. Its revenue in 2015 totalled to 4.9 billion HUF, while in 2017 it 
employed 51 persons in its unit based in Budapest. 
 
Gerdau Hungria Ltd. 
Gerdau (metal industry) is the largest producer of long steel in the Americas, with an installed capacity of 
26 million metric tons of steel per year and offers steel for the civil construction, automobile, industrial, 
agricultural and various sectors. Its Hungarian subsidiary has been established on 29.11.2005, with the 
main activity of asset management and registered capital of 10,7 million EUR. In 2016 however it reported 
zero revenue and employed zero persons, so practically withdrew its activities from the country.  
 
BRF Hungary Ltd. 
BRF is a Brazilian food company, in fact one of the biggest food companies in the world, with over 30 
brands in its portfolio. Its Hungarian subsidiary was established on 07.04.2005. Its activities in Hungary 
cover retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco, and was set up with a registered capital of 3 million HUF 
(the minimum by that time). Its revenues in 2016 totaled to 10,1 billion HUF, and (directly) employed 8 
persons. 
 
KACO Hungary Ltd. (earlier: Sabó Hungary Ltd.) 
Sabó is a Brazilian autoparts manufacturer, one of the world's leading suppliers of seal solutions for the 
world's top auto manufacturers. In Europe Sabó has expanded with the 1993 purchase of Kaco, the 
continent’s second largest producer of seals having plants in both Germany and Austria. And today Sabó 
operates under the Kaco name throughout Europe. 
In 1996 it has set up a manufacturing plant in Enese, in Hungary. With main activities of producing sealing 
systems for the automotive industry, a registered capital of 128,600 EUR, and a revenue totaling to 5,8 
billion HUF in 2014, and 337 employees, the KACO (formerly Sabó) constitutes to be the unique exception 
among the Hungarian subsidiaries of Brazilian companies.  
                                                 
23 Based on data from the Hungarian business register (www.ceginfo.hu) and OPTEN data 
(www.opten.hu), while also relying on data received from the Hungarian Embassy in Brazil (see also 
https://braziliavaros.mfa.gov.hu/page/gazdasagi-kapcsolatok).  
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3.5 Some outstanding examples of Brazilian investments in the ECE region 
Even though we still do not have complete data on the Brazilian companies’ presence 
in ECE countries, we can find some outstanding examples, that provide a preliminary 
picture on the present situation and by listing the most significant and successful 
investments, we might provide some hope for the potential of intensifying the 
cooperation between Brazil and the ECE region: in the aerospace sector for example, the 
Brazilian aircraft producer Embraer signed a cooperation agreement with the Czech 
AERO Vodochody company in 2011 to develop and manufacture together of the 
Embraer KC-390 military transport aircraft (CzechInvest, 2011). According to the latest 
news the production of the first KC-390 series aircraft are ongoing, in cooperation with 
Embraer facilities from Gavião Peixoto in Brazil), Aero Vodochody (in the Czech 
Republic) and OGMA in Portugal. The first KC-390 will be delivered to the Brazilian Air 
Force in the first half of 2018. 
In Slovakia the most important Brazilian investment was the establishment of the 
joint venture Embraco-Slovakia, initiated in 1998 by Brazilian company Embraco, which 
produces refrigeration compressors and employs about 2,600 people in Slovakia. Since 
its arrival Embraco has invested approx. 600 million euros in the Slovakian city Spisska 
Nova Ves, and in 2015 it has announced further investments in the eastern part of 
Slovakia. While in 2016 the Brazilian company has opened a service shared centre in 
Košice, with the outlook of employing 120 to 150 people within two years. The new 
Global Business Support (GBS) Centre provides shared services for the whole Embraco, 
starting with human resources and financial services24. 
At the same time some agglomeration forces can also be revealed, as the Embraco 
investment has attracted the attention of two other smaller Brazilian companies, CRW 
Plasticos (producing plastic components for the automotive industry and the production 
of appliances, electronics and compressors) and Rudolph Usinados (manufacturing 
metal components for the automotive industry), which are also located in the eastern 
part of the country (Kugiel, 2016:23). 
The largest and practically the only investment in Poland is Stefanini, an IT company 
being present in 11 European countries. In Poland a delivery center was settled, and 
                                                 
24 http://www.embraco.sk/aktuality/new-global-centre-in-kosice/  
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started its operation with 100 people in Krakow (Kugiel, 2016:22), while by 2016 
according to media news it was already employing 200 people25 and plans further 
expansion in the ECE region (where it is present besides Poland in Romania and 
Hungary). Stefanini with its application development centres in Eastern Europe 
provides European clients with access to real-time communication, technical and 
language skills that are available at lower costs in these Eastern locations. 
 
4. Outlook 
Before providing an outlook to the results of the most recent survey on the 
internationalization decisions of Brazilian firms, we have to shortly address the 
multidimensional crisis unfolding in Brazil since 2014. 
The Brazilian economy got into recession in technical terms in the second half of 
2014, but the deceleration of economic growth – and accumulation of economic and 
social problems and challenges – goes back already to 2011. Besides this economic crisis 
political changes have also characterized the Brazilian “reality” during most recent 
years. As the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff was much less dominated by 
continuity in economic policy front (as it was expected), and some authors have been 
even writing about a neoliberal U-turn from 2011 on (Serrano-Melin, 2015). A more 
explicit change took place after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, as the new 
President, Michel Temer has deliberately changed the course in economic policies, 
delineating himself explicitly from the previous governing party (the Workers Party, PT) 
and its foreign policies. In the meantime Temer also faces corruption charges (and the 
Lowe House of the Congress has even voted in August 2017 whether to start the 
impeachment process against Temer, however the supporters of acting president has 
proved to have majority and the trial was rejected), and with the ongoing Car Wash 
operation this is significantly adding up to uncertainties in the daily life of the largest 
South American economy. Political changes have also induced important economic 
policy changes, which have resulted in less conducive domestic environment towards 
OFDI flows in Brazil. 
                                                 
25 http://www.nineoclock.ro/itc-sector-engine-of-the-economy-brazils-stefanini-recruits-specialists-for-
polish-centre-coordinated-from-romania/  
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The Brazilian economy is on the negative slide in fact since 2011 and in fact in free 
fall since 2014. This went hand in hand with declining external activities, both in trade 
and investment fields. These negative economic tendencies were layered by political 
changes that have (among others) resulted in a turn towards the domestic front, and 
decreasing ambitions towards the external markets. The ruling government tries to set 
in force market-oriented reforms, which on the short or medium term might result in 
consolidation of the negative economic trends, this remains however to be seen in the 
light of the results of the upcoming presidential elections in 2018 (which will be also 
heavily affected by the outcomes of the Car Wash investigations). 
On the top of these unfavourable domestic conditions, the external environment of 
internationalizing Brazilian companies has also changed significantly. The collapse of 
commodity prices in 2012, and their low levels ever since, the slowdown of the Chinese 
economy and the new lower level of global trade growth, all have led to decreasing 
demand for Brazilian products in the global markets. Looking at investment decisions 
the trend is rather capital outflow from emerging markets towards the safer (perceived) 
more developed countries, and the FED interest rate hikes might accelerate this 
tendency. On the global policy front the new tendencies are dominated by rising 
protectionism (e.g. the withdrawal of the U.S. from the mega-trade deals) and growing 
nationalistic tendencies, just to name a few new external constraints. 
Embedded in this changing internal and external context it is highly interesting how 
Brazilian companies respond to long lasting and newly emerging challenges. Most recent 
data from the Brazilian Central Bank is however indicative in this regard. Net outflows of 
direct investments in Brazil have reached 66 million US dollars in May this year and 
totalled to 841 million US dollars in the period from January to May in 2017, a significant 
fall compared to 6 billion US dollars in the first five months of 201626. 
Turning towards the expectations of top Brazilian multinationals, we look at the 
results of the most recent survey conducted by FDC (2016:85). First we highlight that 
74,5% of the respondent Brazilian MNEs said, that the current political and economic 
context in Brazil has in some forms or other affected their internationalization decisions, 
                                                 
26 BCB, Press Release, 27 June, 2017 https://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/notecon1-i.asp 
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while only 25,5 % claimed, that these have had no impact at all on their 
internationalization strategies. 
According to the same survey 78 % of all responding Brazilian MNEs have increased 
their investments in international markets (and according to the interviewed 
companies, this trend has served mainly to diminish the dependence on the domestic 
market and reduce the risks encountered there). 
In this vein it is also interesting to note, that Brazilian companies are more satisfied 
with their financial performance in international markets, than with their domestic 
performance, which provides a more sophisticated picture than our previous statement 
on the internal and external context: the responding Brazilian MNEs have perceived the 
international economic context to be more favourable (at least in financial terms), that 
the domestic one (FDC, 2016: 90). 
Regarding performance expectations Brazilian MNEs seem to be more optimistic in 
international markets than at home, and the difference between these expectations is 
the biggest in terms of sales performance (in international markets) (FDC, 2016:91). 
Looking at recent trends (between 2013 and 2015) the degree of internationalization 
of Brazilian Multinationals has shown significant and uninterrupted growth in all terms 
(foreign sales, assets and employments). 
For the year 2016 51,1% of the responding companies planned to enter new markets 
(or have done already so by the time of the survey) – in contrast in the 2015 survey only 
43,5% of the respondents indicated to have plans to enter new markets. 
The following countries were named as destinations of new international expansion: 
South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, US, Japan, 
Luxemburg, México, Nicaragua, Panamá and Peru. We have to note that this survey was 
conducted before Donald Trump was elected in the US, which might have altered some 
Brazilian companies’ expansion plans to the US. But also other changes might play an 
important role: such as the new legislation (from December 2016), that has identified 
Austrian holding companies as “privileged tax regime”27 which implies important 
(stricter) transfer price and capitalization regulations. (Note: Dutch and Danish holding 
                                                 
27https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/01/tnf-brazil-certain-austrian-holding-
companies-identified-as-privileged-tax-regime.html  
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companies that have no substantial economic activities were already since 2010 listed 
as „privileged tax systems“.) 
 
5. Conclusions 
Brazilian Multinationals became prominent actors on the global level (global players) 
in the course of the 2000s. We have presented some historical antecedents of this 
success story, and highlighted main home country push factors behind these trends. 
Among the more classical driving forces of the internationalization process, we have laid 
emphasis on the role the Brazilian government has played in this process. 
Our first conclusion is the government policies have actively (directly and indirectly) 
influenced Brazilian companies’ internationalization decisions, and this was especially 
spectacular in the mid of the 2000s. We have argued however that the Brazilian going 
global policy was a much more defensive and limited one, than for example the Chinese 
strategy, even though compared to some regional counterparts (Chile or Argentina), the 
proactivity pf the Brazilian Development Bank stands out. 
In the second part of our study we have turned towards analysing the main 
destinations of Brazil’s outward FDI flows, and by looking at the localization strategies 
of Brazilian companies, we especially focused on the European region, more specifically 
on the Eastern Central European (ECE) region. In this latter regard, the Brazilian 
companies presence in the ECE region however we have only provided some 
preliminary findings, and a more thorough research and field work is needed in the 
future. 
Our second main insights reveals that the ECE region was by far not among the main 
destinations of the Brazilian outward investments, and mainly geographical distance, 
historical factors and cultural differences were the main reasons for this. We have found 
however some outstanding examples of Brazilian investments in the ECE region (such as 
the Embraer investment in the Czech Republic or the Embraco in Slovakia), which prove 
that there are possibilities for mutual cooperation in the future. 
We must also admit that localization strategies of firms are not only affected by home 
country push factors, as more often than not pull factors also come to play, thus 
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incentives and institutional (and other) advantages offered by destination countries 
might even proactively change investment decisions of firms. These factors were left out 
from this study by intention, as this (the analysis of FDI policies and incentives of ECE 
countries) constitutes to form the next step of the broader research project. 
To sum up we highlight during 2000s, the „golden age“ of Brazilian MNEs‘ 
internationalization, when a “dynamic” cycle of transnationalization took place with 
some companies (Vale, Petrobras, and Gerdau, together with other firms in the top 
twenty) taking the lead and becoming reference points for others – not just within 
Brazil, but also throughout Latin America and other emerging countries (Resende et al., 
2010:109). During this period Brazilian MNEs have proved to be able to achieve 
competitive advantages not only within their domestic or natural market, but also on the 
global level. This achievement (along with the distinctive ability and creativity of 
Brazilian firms to operate under volatile conditions) makes us optimistic even amid the 
much less conducive current conditions, driven by economic and political struggles 
within Brazil, layered by one of the largest ever corruption scandal (affecting several top 
20 Brazilian MNEs) and exposed to an increasingly uncertain global environment (paved 
by new protectionist tendencies and decreasing growth of global trade and investment). 
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Annex 1 
Table:  Outward  Foreign  Direct  Investment  stock  in  Brazil  (US$  million) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cayman Islands  16 431   14 124   18 308   29 466   32 138   40 264   42 290   53 292   58 599  
Austria  31 212   31 024   36 268   37 092   47 390   56 618   66 549   48 056   38 756  
Netherlands  2 160   2 380   3 600   10 785   20 819   28 186   30 742   29 096   35 491  
British Virgin Islands  11 245   10 685   13 387   14 724   16 231   22 291   27 399   27 806   26 647  
Bahamas  9 341   9 531   10 291   12 353   12 921   14 500   18 205   22 719   21 338  
Luxembourg  4 259   4 602   4 356   4 794   5 425   14 719   17 350   20 719   17 324  
Spain  4 083   5 055   5 270   8 992   11 187   15 376   19 103   16 215   13 516  
United States  6 063   9 167   9 943   13 184   10 291   18 401   14 086   11 812   9 606  
Chile   509    387    459    574    608   1 107   1 575   1 529   4 040  
Argentina  2 360   3 376   4 251   5 148   5 143   5 511   4 574   4 639   3 941  
Panama  1 185   3 727   1 005   1 614   1 443   2 430   3 253   3 746   3 717  
United Kingdom   805   1 341    977    929   1 065   1 558   2 384   2 399   3 311  
Portugal  1 493   1 449   1 962   3 257   3 008   2 139   2 374   3 909   3 076  
Hungary   901   1 827   1 751   2 489   2 513   3 207   3 026   3 229   2 803  
Uruguay  1 878   2 443   2 531   2 497   2 384   2 951   3 003   3 675   2 627  
Venezuela   218    282    801    679    762   1 083   1 490   2 020   2 080  
Belgium   96    109    276    104    102    939    615   1 632   1 520  
Sweden (c) (c) -   -   (c) -     79    120   1 356  
Curaçao -   -   -   -   -   (c) (c)   19    939  
Mexico   175    249    294    528    688   1 052   1 216   1 092    840  
Peru   584    244    704   2 254   1 902   2 986   3 298   2 809    735  
Paraguai   117    153    170    262    350    578    641    829    697  
Denmark  12 567   8 036   9 698   9 290   9 831    783    779    767    537  
Dominican Republic   7  (c)   23    14    3    293    322    384    435  
Colombia   178    298    561    872   1 194    696    575    495    402  
Canada   16    13   1 128   1 976    230   1 804    323    355    370  
Bermudas   599    234   1 212    577    567    851    734    538    338  
Italy   51    357    398    444    217    191    210    209    322  
Switzerland   83    106    128    148    165    343    343    338    311  
China   83    48    138    148    115    72    91    213    291  
France   156    204    247   1 006    949   1 230   1 216    325    285  
Germany   135    164    154    110    230    225    237    208    235  
Belize   43    43    28    114    55    173    117    194    220  
Virgin Islands (USA)   69    80    161    199    247    246    192    223    211  
Angola   73    58    124    44    75   1 027   1 392   1 285    200  
Ecuador   39    21    22    30    40    68    106    117    155  
Isle of Man   18    19    18    18    18    47    97    125    147  
Seychelles -   -   -   (c)   48    4    85    126    129  
Japan   41    42    40    41    114    108    94    91    120  
Bolivia   53    48    67    86    96    96    128    98    93  
Hong Kong   0    1    2    3    7    17    21    170    91  
Guernsey   11    10  (c) -   -   -   (c)   87    81  
New Zealand -   -   (c)   77    84    56    42    58    75  
South Africa (c)   7    5    21    15    91    90    97    71  
Liechtenstein   4    1    2    2    2    13    10    23    68  
Australia   0  (c) (c) (c)   1  (c)   71    62    65  
Malta -   -   -   -   -   (c)   9    18    57  
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Costa Rica   27    56    56    60    56    72    71    58    50  
Guatemala (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c)   4    1    48  
Marshall Islands (c) (c) -   (c) (c)   40    45    42    46  
Ireland (c) -   (c)   462  (c)   5    27    32    46  
Saint Lucia -   (c) (c)   2    7    3    7    22    44  
Saint Kitts and Nevis   12    15    14    19    20    35    42    41    39  
Ghana -   -   (c) (c) (c) -     1    8    34  
Turkey (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c)   2    29  
Mozambique (c) (c) (c)   54    35    42    43    25    25  
Honduras -   -   -   -   -   -   -     9    24  
El Salvador (c) (c) -   (c) (c) (c)   8    11    23  
United Arab Emirates   0    6    4    11    2    6    1    1    17  
Puerto Rico   7    5    6    7    6    4    10    13    16  
Slovakia (c) (c)   659    166    166    42  (c)   18    16  
Jersey Islands   30    233    92    131    126    96    96    46    8  
Gibraltar   324    332    362  (c)   403    7    7    8    8  
India (c)   5  (c)   16    21    157    18    9    8  
Monaco -   -   -   (c) (c)   9    13    12    4  
Norway   2    7    9    105    100    6    33    2    1  
Netherlands Antilles  1 351   1 052    224    550    489   1 447   1 356   1 039  -   
Bahrain (c)   1    71    2    2  (c) (c) (c) (c) 
Turks and Caicos Islands   29    22    40    56    53    59    77    82  (c) 
Other1/   215    72    115    481    776    813    525    381    538  
    Total 111 339  113 755  132 413  169 066  192 933  247 172  272 921  269 832  259294 
(c) Confidential data, composed by less than three 
respondents.        
1/ Includes countries that have not reached, in any year, the criterion of minimum US$ 10 million stock distributed among at least 
03 (three) respondents: Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda; Armenia; Aruba; Barbados; Botswana; 
Bulgaria; Cameroon; Canary Islands; Central African Republic; Congo; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Dominica; Egypt; 
Equatorial Guinea; Finland; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Kenya; Lebanon; Liberia; Libya; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Mauritius; Morocco; Namibia; Nepal; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Niue Island; Oman; Poland; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saint 
Barthélemy; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Slovenia; South Korea; Suriname; 
Taiwan; Trinidad and Tobago; Uganda; Ukraine; United States Minor Outlying Islands; Western Samoa. 
Source: Brazilian Central Bank (2017) 
 
